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TOPIC IV.B.1
WILLIAM B. FISCH
Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the
United States
In the following report I shall concentrate on the law as pro-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court, which has, within the
sphere of judicial competence, the last say on the interpretation of
the Constitution. The volume of significant litigation on the subject
which stops below the Supreme Court has been relatively light, and
the constitutional law declared by the lower courts has played a less
significant role than is the case in many other issues. Indeed, as we
shall see, the Supreme Court itself has had less to say on the topic
than might be hoped for. I shall try to indicate the main lines of
scholarly debate, which is vast in quantity, if not always in insight;
but it must be said that in constitutional law as a whole, and in this
area in particular, the influence of scholarly opinion on the behavior
of governments and courts has been less than may be observed in
other fields of American law.
I. IN GENERAL
A. Text of the Constitution
Neither the term "emergency" nor any cognate of comparable
generality appears in the text of the United States Constitution.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Framers considered the
question of how to deal with emergencies, or "exigencies"' , and be-
lieved that they had fashioned a document which would permit the
government to do so effectively. Evidence of this thinking in the
document itself can be seen in two forms: (i) allocation of authority
over particular functions clearly relating to emergency situations,
and (ii) express exceptions to general rules conditioned on the exist-
ence of such situations. The lists themselves, which may be thought
rather modest in length for a 20th-century superpower, are instruc-
tive as to what was understood at that time to be involved.
WILLIAM B. FISCH is Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See I.B. below.
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1. Powers Relating to Emergency Situations
Article I § 8 of the Constitution gives the Congress extensive
powers relating to war and other military action, which might be
listed in three categories for present purposes:
(a) to declare war;
(b) to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a
navy, and to make rules for the government and regu-
lation of the land and naval forces; and
(c) to provide for calling forth the militia (generally a
state responsibility) for three specified purposes: (i) to
execute the laws of the Union, (ii) to suppress insur-
rections, and (iii) to repel invasions.
Article II, which vests the Executive Power in the President,
also specifically makes her Commander in Chief of the army and
navy, as well as of the militia when called into actual federal service
(§ 2), and charges her, among other things, with taking care that the
laws be faithfully executed (§ 3).
In addition to these allocations of responsibility to particular
branches of the federal government, the Constitution contains one
other empowering provision relating to similar circumstances,
namely Article IV § 4, the so-called "guaranty clause", which calls
on the federal government not only to guarantee to every state a re-
publican form of government, but also to protect it against invasion
and (when asked) domestic violence. 2
2. Exceptions to General Rules, for Emergency Situations
There are three specific exceptions of this sort in the text, two
relating to individual rights and the third relating to the powers of
the states vis-a-vis the national government. First, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus (permitting a person to obtain judicial re-
view of the validity of his detention, in a proceeding independent of
that, if any, in which the detention was ordered) cannot be sus-
pended, "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the. public
Safety may require it."'3 Second, no one may be charged with a capi-
tal or otherwise infamous crime without an indictment by a grand
jury, "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger."'4
Third, no state may engage in war, "unless actually invaded, or in
2. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion, and on Appli-
cation of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be con-
vened), against domestic Violence."
3. Article I § 9, cl. 2.
4. Fifth Amendment, cl. 1.
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such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."5 Finally, one
other provision of similar, if less specifically military character may
be mentioned: that which allows the President "on extraordinary
Occasions" to convene one or both houses of Congress. 6
Two things about these provisions are especially noteworthy in
relation to our topic. One is that while the allocations of power are
general, the exceptions are specific to particular limitations on gov-
ernment action, inviting the conclusion that the Framers intended
no other exceptions to be recognized. The other is that - with the
exception of the last one - they all have to do with force and vio-
lence: war, invasion, rebellion, insurrection, the use of the militia to
enforce the laws. Despite the facts that "promot(ing) the general
Welfare" and "secur(ing) the Blessings of Liberty" are listed along
with "insur(ing) domestic Tranquility" and "provid(ing) for the com-
mon defense" in the Preamble, and that -- as the most cursory read-
ing of Article I § 8 reveals - creating a national government with
power to regulate economic activity was an equally explicit concern
of its dispositive provisions, nowhere in the document is to be found
a recognition of economic or other non-military emergencies as situ-
ations for exceptional action. The obvious questions for interpreta-
tion, therefore, are: (i) whether war or other military emergency
warrants any exceptions to the normal arrangements other than
those expressly set forth, and (ii) whether non-military emergency
warrants any exception at all.
B. Orthodox Doctrine in Military Emergencies: the "Perfect
Constitution "7?
Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist,8 argued in support of
adoption of the Constitution that it should provide the national gov-
ernment with all the power it needs to deal with any of the emer-
gencies which confront any nation. With respect to the complex of
powers relating to "common defense", he said:
"These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it
is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety
of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and va-
riety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.9
5. Article I § 10 para. 3.
6. Article II § 3 cl. 2.
7. The quoted phrase is from C. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship at 213
(1948) (hereafter cited as Rossiter, Dictatorship). See also id, at 212: "It is
constitutional dogma that this document foresees any and every emergency, and that
no departure from its solemn injunctions could possibly be necessary."
8. A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay, The Federalist (B. F. Wright ed., Harvard U.
Press, 1961), hereinafter cited as Federalist.
9. Federalist No. 23 at pp. 199-200 (emphasis in original). To the same effect
see Federalist No. 41 (Madison), at pp. 294-5. For further arguments by Hamilton in
1990]
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Particularly revealing of Hamilton's thinking is the argument in
No. 25 on the peacetime army. He cited the example of Penn-
sylvania, whose bill of rights disapproved of standing armies but
which had maintained one in peacetime anyway, as teaching "how
unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public neces-
sity." He went on to drive home the point that restrictions on power
in times of emergency are counterproductive:
"... .(N)ations pay little regard to rules and maxims calcu-
lated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities
of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering
the government with restrictions that cannot be observed,
because they know that every breach of the fundamental
laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred rev-
erence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers
towards the constitution of a country, and forms a prece-
dent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity
does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable."10
Like the constitution itself, however, all of Hamilton's discussion of
emergency deals with war and other physical threats to peace; ex-
cept perhaps for the identification of commerce as a major source of
war among republics,'" there is no mention of emergency in the Fed-
eralist's rather less extensive references to economic matters.' 2
When one turns these arguments into principles of interpreta-
tion, as courts and governments operating under the document must
do once it has been adopted, at least two logically consistent but po-
tentially divergent principles suggest themselves: (1) that the Con-
stitution was intended to function in emergencies as well as in
normal times, and therefore an emergency affords no excuse for de-
viating from its terms;13 and (2) that because it must function in
emergencies as well as in normal times, it should be interpreted
broadly to provide the government with whatever power may be
needed to meet the emergency that is actually presented. 14 To the
extent that the two are inconsistent, it seems clear that Hamilton
the same vein see No. 25, id. at 212-3 (peacetime army); No. 28, id. at 222 (use of force
to enforce the laws); No. 36, id. at 264 (against prohibiting poll taxes).
10. Federalist No. 25, at 213.
11. Federalist No. 6, at 110-112.
12. The most important numbers on the latter subject are Nos. 11-13. Wright, in
his introduction to the Harvard Press edition of The Federalist, notes the relative
absence of discussion of the relationship of government to economic and social af-
fairs, and the anomaly of such an omission by the committed mercantilist Hamilton
in particular: see note 8 at 85-6.
13. This view has been labeled "absolutist" by Lobel, "Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism", 98 Yale L. Rev. 1385, 1387 (1989).
14. Lobel, id. at 1388, labels this the "relativist" position, and attributes it to
Hamilton.
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himself favored the latter.' 5
Both of these principles have been applied by the Supreme
Court in different cases. The most cited example of the first is Ex
parte Milligan,'6 decided after the Civil War, invalidating the crimi-
nal conviction of a civilian by military commission in a non-rebel-
lious area as a violation of the rights to indictment and trial by jury.
Justice Davis' majority opinion offers an impassioned rejection of
extraconstitutional powers (albeit in obiter dictum! 7 ):
"The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more perni-
cious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of ne-
cessity on which it is based is false; for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it
which are necessary to preserve its existence, as has been
happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off
its just authority."' 8
Perhaps the most often-quoted assertion of the second was pub-
lished in 1917 by Charles Evans Hughes, who was then between
terms on the Court, asserting that the war power is "a power to
wage war successfully", and that "we have afighting constitution.' u9
15. Jefferson, after his presidency, wrote a letter to the effect that in times of
danger leaders were obligated to save the country even if it meant violating the law.
Letter from Jefferson to Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810, in 11 Works of Thomas Jefferson 146,
148-49 (P. Ford ed. 1905). This has been characterized as a third, ge; di fr "liberal"
alternative to the two interpretive positions just outlined, which posits a division of
executive authority between "normal constitutional conduct" governed by law, and
emergency action, in which "law must be replaced by discretion and politics". Lobel,
note 13, at 1390. It is, to be sure, a theory of executive responsibility, and no doubt
also a Lheory about the relationship of law to politics and everyday life. It is not,
however, a distinct theory of constitutional interpretation, since in Jefferson's own
formulation the executive so acting "does indeed risk himself on the justice of the
controlling powers of the Constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that
risk.. ." Loc. cit. at 149. Rather, it presupposes that the Constitution is interpreted
according to one of the other two principles, and that the executive who violates the
Constitution as so interpreted will have to answer for it. Hamilton's position, on the
other hand, the "relativist", argues the unwisdom of so structuring a Constitution as
to force a president, to violate it, namely that it would do more harm to the respect
for the law than would an adaptation of the law to fit anticipated emergency.
16. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
17. The opinion had already clearly held that the trial by military commission
was contrary to a valid statute.
18. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-121.
19. Hughes, "War Powers and the Constitution", 42 Am. Bar Ass'n Rep. 232, 238
(1917).
1990]
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Twenty years later, as Chief Justice, he paraphrased himself in a
case which upheld State action providing temporary debtor relief in
an economic emergency against the claim that it violated the so-
called Contract Clause20 :
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.... The con-
stitutional question presented in the light of an emergency
is whether the power possessed embraces the particular ex-
ercise of it in response to particular conditions. Thus, the
war power of the federal government is not created by the
emergency of war, but it. is a power given to meet that
emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus
it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the peo-
ple in a supreme co-operative effort to preserve the
nation."21
Indeed the Court had expressed this view of the war powers
both before and after Milligan - as for example in Martin v.
Mott22, where Justice Story said that the powers to regulate and
command the militia "must be so construed as to the modes of their
exercise as not to defeat the great end in view,"23 and in Miller v.
United States,24 where it was said of Congress's war powers:
"Upon the exercise of these powers no restrictions are im-
posed. Of course the power to declare war involves the
power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in
which war may be legitimately prosecuted. '2 5
C. Reality: Deference During the Military Emergency, Lectures
Afterwards?
In what is still one of the best available political studies of the
Supreme Court's handling of the President's military and quasi-mili-
tary functions,2 6 the political scientist Clinton Rossiter concluded
that "(t)here do indeed seem to be two Constitutions - one for war,
one for peace. '27 What he meant was not so much different rules
for each condition, but different judicial voices. Writing in 1951,
Rossiter described what he observed to be a consistent judicial pat-
20. Art. I § 10 para. 1: "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts..."
21. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
22. 12 Wheat. 19 (1827).
23. Id. at 30.
24. 78 U.S. 268 (1871).
25. Id. at 305.
26. C. Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief (expanded ed.
Longaker 1976) (hereafter cited as Rossiter, Commander).
27. Id. at 129.
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tern in each of our then three great wars (Civil War, World War I,
World War II):
"Bello flagrante, we may expect [decisions] ... pointing to
power. Post bellum we will hear about limitations... 2 s
Prime illustration of this behavior, in his view, was precisely Ex
parte Milligan,29 when juxtaposed with another decision arising out
of the same Civil War practice of trying civilians by military com-
mission for ordinary crimes in states which were not in rebellion: Ex
parte Vallandigham.30 In the latter case, decided in 1864 while the
war was at its peak, the Court refused to hear a civilian's petition for
direct review (by means of the writ of certiorari) of his conviction by
the military tribunal, on the ground that it lacked appellate jurisdic-
tion over such non-regular tribunals. In Ex parte Milligan, decided
in 1866 after the war was over, the Court agreed to review such a
decision under the writ of habeas corpus, and found it invalid.
While a lawyer will be more impressed than a political scientist
might be by the distinction between appeal and habeas corpus as
remedies for unlawful detention,31 Rossiter's assessment is sup-
ported by the opening paragraph of Justice Davis' discussion of the
merits in Milligan:
"During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times
did not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion
so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial
question. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with
the exercise of power; and feelings and interests prevailed
which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is
assured, this question, as well as all others, can be discussed
and decided without passion or the admixture of any ele-
ment not required to form a legal judgment. '3 2
A second illustrative pair of cases for Rossiter was Korematsu v.
United States,33 which during the Second World War sustained the
28. Id. at 128.
29. See text accompanying note 16 above.
30. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
31. The distinction is based on the scope of review, which in appeal (or other di-
rect review) could include simple error, but in habeas corpus could include only the
jurisdiction of the committing agency and its conformity to statutory limitations.
See, e.g., Dyne v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167.
(1885); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902). The statutes governing courts
martial now make this clear, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1982). Moreover, in habeas corpus, re-
view is undertaken in the lower courts, as a separate proceeding, and the Supreme
Court's role is that of reviewing decisions of lower regular courts. Finally, the Con-
stitution plainly makes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court subject to
statutory regulation, Art. III § 2 para.2.
32. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 109 (emphasis in original), quoted by Rossiter, Com-
mander at 37-38.
33. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
1990]
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wholly preventive (and probably objectively unnecessary) intern-
ment of thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and
Duncan v. Kahanamoku,34 which after the war struck down the
post-Pearl Harbor imposition of martial law in Hawaii, at least to
the extent that it authorized substitution of military tribunals for
civil ones when the latter were capable of functioning.
35
Rossiter's point is that the Court has been a relatively ineffec-
tive reviewer of war-based governmental action, and that the more
resounding assertions of constitutional limitation have been too late
and too peripheral to do much practical good. The effective judicial
reaction to emergency action, in his view, has been that which defers
to power during its exercise.36 In this he echoed the skepticism of
Alexander Hamilton about the usefulness of law in the face of per-
ceived necessity, and Justice Jackson's warning in dissent from
Korematsu that courts cannot be relied upon for review or restraint
of military judgments.37
D. Special Constitutional Rules for Non-Military Emergencies?
We have said that there is no indication either in the document
34. 327 U.S. 304 (1946), discussed by Rossiter, Commander at 57-59.
35. The majority opinion did not reach the constitutional issue, but rested
wholly on interpretation of the Act of Congress establishing the territorial govern-
ment of Hawaii and the specific provision thereof which authorized the declaration
of martial law: it found no reason to interpret the Act as authorizing conduct "so
obviously contrary to our political traditions", 327 U.S. at 317, as military trial -
without judicial review - of civilians charged with crime. Justice Murphy's concur-
ring opinion insisted that displacement of functional civilian courts was unconstitu-
tional as well. In defense of Rossiter's assessment, it does appear that the Court
gave the war a chance to end before deciding, see E. Corwin, The President: Office
and Powers 289-90 (5th ed. by Bland, Hindson & Peltason) (hereafter cited as
Corwin, President).
36. Rossiter, Commander at 127-8: "Whatever limits the Court has set upon the
employment of the war powers have been largely theoretical, rarely practi-
cal .... Future Presidents are likely to pay about as much attention to these decisions
as did Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt; the first and third were long dead, Wilson but
three days from the end of his term, when the great limiting decision of each one's
particular war was announced by a stern-visaged Court."
37. "Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, so
centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty.
But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me
wholly delusive. The military reasonableness of these orders can only be deter-
mined by military superiors. If the people ever let command of the war power fall
into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its re-
straint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the
country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political
judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history." 323 U.S.
at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's basis for dissenting from the particular
judgment, however, was that while the courts could not restrain an unreasonable ex-
ercise of military power, they could properly refuse to implement it through judicial
action, specifically by refusing to impose a criminal sentence on a person who failed
to obey the relocation order.
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itself, or in the adoption literature supporting it, of an intention to
provide exceptional rules for non-military emergencies - that is, to
permit certain government action in emergency situations which
would be impermissible in normal times. Rather, it appears to have
been assumed that the power to regulate encompasses whatever
power is needed to deal with emergencies. On the whole, the few
Supreme Court decisions purporting to address the question have
borne out this assumption. On the one hand, however, the Court's
pronouncements on federal powers have not always clearly distin-
guished between military and non-military emergencies; and on the
other, it has treated State action in non-military emergencies rather
more liberally than it has treated federal action.
1. Federal Powers
For a time it appeared that the Court would recognize a general
emergency power in the federal government, which would encom-
pass economic and social as well as military emergencies. Two cases
in particular offered tantalizing hints. In Wilson v. New38 (1917),
against a claim based on earlier cases that it constituted an imper-
missible impairment of "freedom of contract",3 9 the Court held that
Congress could properly impose an 8-hour day on the railroads in
favor of their employees, solely to prevent a general strike called af-
ter labor-management negotiations failed. The majority clearly
claimed to be applying an existing power, but emphasized the emer-
gency involved; the dissents claimed that the majority was simply in-
troducing an "emergency" exception to established limitations in
violation of the principle of Ex parte Milligan.40 The precise status
of the claimed restrictions was then unclear,41 and in any event
there is reason to believe that the majority opinion was influenced
by war powers thinking.42 In Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow
38. 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
39. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), all finding the freedom of contract to be
a protected "liberty" under the due process clause.
40. See note 16.
41. The Court did not firmly commit itself to excluding production from the
scope of the commerce clause until the following year, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918), and, since applying the due process clause to regulations of the em-
ployment relationship, it had already not only allowed the states to impose maxi-
mum hours for women employees, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), but had
also allowed Congress to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce of tainted
food, Hipolite Egg Co. v. U.S., 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (sustaining the Pure Food and Drug
Act), and of women for immoral purposes, Hoke v. U.S., 227 U.S. 45 (1913) (sus-
taining the Mann Act).
42. No mention is made in the majority opinion of the impending war, but it was
later reported that Chief Justice White wrote it with the greater emergency in mind,
as had the President and Congress in proposing and enacting the legislation. See
1990]
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Co.43 (1929) the Court sustained the wartime Lever Act authorizing
the fixing of coal prices by the President, against a claim of freedom
of contract. While the majority relied expressly on the war powers,
it also used more general language:
"It is also well established by the decisions of this court that
such liberty is not absolute or universal and that Congress
may regulate the making and performance of such contracts
whenever reasonably necessary to effect any of the great
purposes for which the national government was
created .... 44
In 1935, however, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.,45 the
Court emphatically rejected any purely peacetime emergency excep-
tion to what it then understood to be firm limitations on the federal
power to regulate commerce, namely that purely local conduct is not
included:
"... .(T)he argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to
justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional
authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or en-
large constitutional power.... Such assertions of extracon-
stitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the
explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment .... ,46
The government seems after this case to have given up arguing
for peacetime emergency powers, standing (and losing) twice in the
ensuing year on the normal scope of the commerce power 47 in sup-
port of major legislation designed to combat the depression. Within
five more years after losing these battles, however, they had won
the constitutional war. The Court itself abandoned essentially all of
its limitations on the normal scope of the commerce clause, 48 as well
as its claim that due process requires more than a rational basis for
Belknap, "The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine", 62 Tex. L. Rev. 67,
80 (1983), with references.
43. 279 U.S. 153 (1929).
44. 279 U.S. at 261.
45. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
46. 295 U.S. at 528-9.
47. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act controls on ag-
ricultural production); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act). For an account of the government's strategy see Belknap,
note 42 at 93-98 (1983), with further references.
48. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ("commerce"
does not exclude "production"); U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ("commerce
among the several states" includes not only that local conduct which "directly af-
fects" such commerce, but also that which indirectly but "substantially" affects it);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (the clause also encompasses local action, not
otherwise "substantially" affecting interstate commerce, where the cumulative effect
of multiple instances of such action would be substantial - in that case a single
farmer growing wheat on his own farm for personal consumption, as affecting the
national market for wheat crops).
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economic regulation;4 9 the quest for purely peacetime domestic
emergency powers was thus deprived of most, if not all, of its raison
d' etre.5
2. State Powers
Already in the first half of the 19th century, when the Court
was first giving a broad interpretation to the grant to Congress (then
not much used) of the power to regulate interstate commerce, and
had not yet given up the idea that the power was exclusive,51 but
still understood the range of purely local economic activity outside
of that power and therefore subject to direct state regulation to be
large, it also recognized a distinct residual5 2 power in the ,states -
called the "police power" - to regulate even economic activity for
purposes of health, safety, and morals. This power existed alongside
Congress's explicitly economic power and yielded normally not to
the constitutional grant itself but only to a valid, inconsistent exer-
cise of that federal power.5 3
In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 5 (1934) the Court
confronted the police power claim offered in support of an explicitly
economic regulation having the effect of altering the content of ex-
isting contracts, against objection based on the Contract Clause, an
express limitation on state economic regulation. Specifically, loans
secured by mortgages on real estate, which under the contracts
could be foreclosed on default of loan payments, were altered by
temporarily suspending the right of foreclosure while leaving all
49. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
50. Belknap, note 42, argues that it was a mistake to abandon the emergency
powers doctrine, because it would be useful in dealing with certain other limitations
which the Court has more recently found applicable to Congressional action, see pp.
104f. More on these limitations - one of which has been adandoned already by the
Court - below.
51. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198-200 (1824).
52. That is, not derived from a specific constitutional grant of power to the states
but inherent in their sovereign function, and recognized by the 10th Amendment to
the Constitution as "reserved to the States. . ." to the extent not granted to the fed-
eral government. For early recognition that the states' regulatory powers, to the ex-
tent not specifically limited by the constitution, were indefinite, see Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (Dall.) 396 (1798).
53. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (dam
across navigable stream to drain swamp); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102 (1837) (requiring passenger data from ships coming into city's port). In the
20th century this "police power" was found to be subject to some limitations implicit
in the interstate commerce clause - in particular, that it could not be so exercised
as to regulate competition in interstate commerce as such, (Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925)), or to discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local in-
terests, (Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)), or to impose undue burdens on the flow
of interstate commerce (Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 349 U.S. 472 (1945); Ray-
mond Motor Transportation Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1980)).
54. See text at notes 20 and 21.
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other obligations - including that of paying interest - intact. The
state based its statute on the existence of an emergency (the Depres-
sion) and its police power, and the Court - reviewing the entire
range of contract clause cases5 5 _ sustained the statute on the same
grounds. In subsequent decisions, even those in which statutes were
struck down under the contract clause, the continued vitality of the
Blaisdell formula for the emergency situation is always assumed.5
E. Judicial Definitions
In general, the Court has been extremely deferential to the rel-
evant political authority's determination that a war, invasion, insur-
rection, rebellion, or emergency exists for constitutional purposes.
It held, for example, that it was proper for Congress, in its statute
providing for calling forth the militia to enforce the laws, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions, to vest exclusive authority in the
president to determine when any of those needs has arisen, and to
provide for trial by court-martial of any militiaman disobeying the
president's order to mobilize.57 In recognizing a general power of a
state government to declare martial law when necessary to put
down an insurrection, as well as the president's power to call up the
militia to aid the state on request, the Court treated both decisions
as essentially political in nature, not subject to judicial second-guess-
ing.58 In determining the propriety of seizing ships which had been
trading in Confederate ports contrary to a presidentially declared
blockade, as prizes of war, the Court held that the President's proc-
lamation was itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a state of
war justifying exercise of the rights of war.59 In recognizing a
State's power to impair the obligation of contract in time of emer-
55. In particular the Court relied on decisions which sustained state rent control
regulations designed to prevent landlords from evicting their tenants during a de-
clared public emergency in the availability of housing just after the war, and thereby
rejected the contract clause claim, Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S.
170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922). See also Block
v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), involving the District of Columbia (governed by Acts
of Congress).
56. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (imposition
of additional payments into private pension plan, invalid); United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (diversion of revenues from public utility to purposes
expressly forbidden by agreement with private investors, invalid).
57. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
58. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1847). "The State itself must deter-
mine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the government of Rhode Is-
land deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified throughout the
State, as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of martial law,
we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority." Id. at 45.
59. "Whether the President . . . in suppressing an insurrection, has met with
such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will
compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be de-
cided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the polit-
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gency, it indicated that the State's declaration of emergency would
be given effect unless it were a "subterfuge" without adequate
basis.60
Occasionally, however, the Court has imposed some limiting
definitions on the government. It held in Ex parte Milligan6' that
the power of martial law - at least for the federal government -
was limited to actual, as distinguished from threatened invasion,
such that the courts are closed and the civil administration disabled;
the absence of any claim that such was the case was treated as con-
clusive, without the Court having to decide whether to put the gov-
ernment to its proof in support of such a claim.62 In Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair63 it was held that a housing emergency resulting
from the First World War, sufficient to support the imposition of
rent controls, no longer existed in 1923 despite Congress's having re-
newed the law in 1922 for a period of 2 years;64 although it did not
have occasion to question Congress' finding of continued emergency
at the time of renewal, it did indicate a willingness to correct "an
obvious mistake" in making such a finding if one had been made.65
When a governor declared martial law to enforce oil production quo-
tas, claiming that the producers were "in a state of insurrection
against the State" and threatening violence, the Court held the dec-
laration invalid absent evidence of "actual uprising", "riots or mobs",
"actual violence or attempt at violence", or "interference with the
civil authorities or the courts" - the general language of the gover-
nor's declaration being treated as insufficient for that purpose.66
And the Court held in Reid v. Covert,67 in denying the jurisdiction of
ical department of the Government to which this power was entrusted .... The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635, 670 (1863) (emphasis in original).
60. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
61. See note 16.
62. See also, to the same effect, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, note 34.
63. 264 U.S. 543 (1923).
64. "A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state
of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change
even though valid when passed." 264 U.S. at 547-8. The case was remanded for a
determination of whether the emergency existed at the time the administrative or-
der reducing rents was made (1922), assuming that it did exist at the time of Con-
gress' extension of the law.
65. Id. at 547.
66. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). In Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909), often cited for the non-reviewability of declarations of martial law, the Court
through Justice Holmes had appeared to recognize a possible good-faith standard:
"Such arrests [under martial law] are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way
of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are
made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the
insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action
after he is out of office on the ground that he had riot reasonable ground for his be-
lief. . . ." Id. at 84-35.
67. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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military tribunals over charges of on-base murder against wives of
servicemen abroad, that neither the power of Congress to regulate
the "land and naval Forces" (Art. I § 8 cl. 14), nor the Fifth Amend-
ment's exception to the right to grand jury indictment in capital
crimes arising in the armed forces, extends to such civilian depen-
dents in peacetime.68
II. EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY ON RULES OF COMPETENCE
A. Executive vs. Legislative Branches of Federal Government
1. Independent Presidential Power
Throughout our constitutional history, strong presidents have
claimed not only that the Constitution provides ample authority to
deal with emergencies as well as normal times, but that the execu-
tive is the preeminent holder of such authority.69 In its more ex-
treme form, the so-called "stewardship theory", the claim denies to
Congress any non-enumerated power to control executive action.70
Most often the argument has been that this preeminence is inherent
in the executive power, of which the enumerations in Art. II (com-
mander-in-chief, appointment, pardon, faithful execution of the
laws) are only particular manifestations. The Supreme Court's re-
sponses to these claims have been mostly non-committal, although it
has accepted the idea that the grant of executive power has some
content beyond the specific enumerations. 71 One reason for this ju-
dicial reticence, no doubt, is that in our great emergencies Congress
has usually granted the executive unusual authority in advance or
has ratified his emergency action afterward.
In particular, what it has said about the power of the President
to act where Congress was understood to have been silent has been
ambiguous at best. In 1863, in The Prize Cases72, it affirmed the
power of the President to wage a defensive war against rebellious
states (specifically, the imposition of a blockade) without a Congres-
sional declaration of war; indeed it suggested that Congress had no
authority to declare war against states;73 but the President's author-
ity to use force to suppress insurrection derived from an Act of Con-
68. See also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)(noncapital offenses by de-
pendents). The same rule applies to offenses by civilian employees of the armed
forces, Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960).
69. See, for an admirable overview, Corwin, President ch. 1.
70. See Corwin, President at 174-5.
71. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926), in support of an exclusive
presidential power to remove appointed officers, inferred from the appointment
power. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 210-1 (2d ed 1988).
72. 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635 (1863).
73. Id. at 668.
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gress. In 1871, after reciting the constitutional grants of power to
Congress and the President, and holding that a statute suspending
the prescription of private rights of action during the civil war was
valid, the Court said:
"The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to sup-
press insurrection, are not defined. The decision of all such
questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom
the substantial powers involved are confided by the
Constitution. '74
In 1890 it held that the President had the power, in the absence
of Congressional prohibition, to assign a U.S. marshal (peace officer
under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General) to protect a
Supreme Court Justice against threatened violence, which officer
had authority to kill the attacker.75
In the 1930's it affirmed one major, if somewhat vaguely de-
fined, exclusive power of the President: that of "sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations",76 in the
exercise of which he could not only determine whether or not to
recognize the legitimacy of a foreign government, but could also
enter into legally binding agreements with that government without
going through the formal treaty-making process involving Senate
advice and consent.77 The Court found support for this unique role,
however, not merely in the inherent content of the executive power
but also in long-standing acquiescence and encouragement by
Congress. 78
In 1952 the Court did get more specific about the President's in-
dependent powers in the Steel Seizure Cases,79 although even this
can be seen as simply reaffirming several very early holdings sus-
taining Congress in direct conflict with the President.8 0 In the mid-
dle of the Korean conflict, after various procedures prescribed under
74. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506 (1870).
75. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
76. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
77. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), specifically involving the as-
signment from government to government of claims to property, to which private
persons also claimed title.
78. See the extended review of congressional delegations to presidents in foreign
affairs matters in Curtiss-Wright, note 76, at 322-328.
79. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For an account
of the political background and significance see Longaker, in Rossiter, Commander
at xvii-xxiii.
80. E.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (statute had identified
ships subject to seizure, interpreted as precluding seizure of others, non-authorized
seizure ordered by the President therefore unlawful); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362 (1824) (seizure inconsistent with international law, and not supported by
statute, therefore unlawful); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 128 (1851) (in
action against military commander for wrongful seizure, where seizure sought to be
justified by military necessity, jury question as to whether proof of necessity was suf-
1990]
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statute had failed to produce a settlement of wage disputes in the
steel industry, President Truman ordered the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize the affected steel mills and operate them for the
United States, in order to prevent a threatened strike which might
affect military production. In a highly unusual expedited procedure,
the Court held his action invalid. In the majority opinion, Justice
Black characterized the action as a taking of property, an inherently
legislative act which the executive could not undertake without
Congressional authorization, even in an emergency. At least four of
the six Justices making up the majority, however, rested their deci-
sions specifically on the finding that Congress had implicitly forbid-
den the President to' use this seizure remedy for labor disputes,
because in the course of adopting a comprehensive regulation of the
subject called the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress had considered
and rejected a provision for such remedy.8 ' The most frequently
cited opinion in the case, however, has been that of Justice Jackson,
who posited a scale of presidential power in relation to Congress: at
its fullest when acting, under Congressional authorization, still sub-
stantial when relying on independent powers absent Congressional
authority, and "at its lowest ebb" when acting contrary to the will of
Congress.8 2
With respect to the claimed emergency powers of the President,
the majority rejected them in the particular case. While Justice
Black did not consider the possibility of an emergency sufficient to
allow the present conduct, Justices Clark and Burton thought that
war closer to home might be sufficient.8 3 Once again, however, Jus-
tice Jackson is the most quotable:
"The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of in-
herent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us
to do what many think would be wise, although it is some-
thing the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergen-
ficient). And of course the famous Milligan case itself, note 16, sustained a statutory
limitation on the President.
81. E.g., Justice Burton, concurring: "The controlling fact here is that Congress,
within its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific
procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of emer-
gency. Congress has reserved to itself the right to determine where and when to au-
thorize the seizure of property in meeting such an emergency. Under these
circumstances, the President's order of April 8 invaded the jurisdiction of Congress."
343 U.S. at 660.
82. 343 U.S. at 634f.
83. E.g., Burton, J., 343 U.S. at 659: "The present situation is not comparable to
that of an imminent invasion or threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what
might be the President's constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations.
Nor is it claimed that the current seizure is in the nature of a military command
addressed by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging,
or imminently threatened with, total war."
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cies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they sus-
pected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emer-
gencies. Aside from suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public
safety may require it, they made no express provision for
exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I do
not think we rightfully may so amend their work .... 84
2. Congressional Delegation of Power to the President
By far the most important basis for what everyone has per-
ceived as a massive shift of law-making authority to the Executive
from the Legislative branch in this century, however, has been legis-
lative delegation, beginning at least with the First World War
(though earlier delegations resting explicitly on the use of military
power had been quite extensive) and continuing to the present time,
designed expressly to allow the President to deal effectively with
emergencies, whether involving international or domestic violence
on the one hand or economic crises on the other. The most impor-
tant delegations in WWI - all requested by President Wilson -
were (i) the Espionage Act of 191785, along with the Sedition Law of
191886, defining as crimes not only obstruction of recruitment, but
also the utterance of disloyal or abusive language about the govern-
ment, and authorizing the closing of the mails and other censorship;
(ii) the Lever Act of 191787, authorizing wholesale regulation of the
economy for war purposes; and (iii) the Trading with the Enemy Act
of 1917,88 authorizing censorship of international communications as
well as regulation of all economic transactions with hostile coun-
tries.8 9 Only one of these laws was successfully challenged as an im-
proper delegation of legislative authority to the President, and that
only in one detail: the Lever Act's provision prohibiting the willful
making of "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or
dealing with any necessaries" was struck down on due process
grounds, as too vague to fix a standard for criminal liability or to in-
84. 343 U.S. at 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. 40 Stat. 217.
86. 40 Stat. 553.
87. 40 Stat. 276.
88. 40 Stat. 411.
89. After it was used by Roosevelt as the basis for his initial actions in 1933 to
combat the depression - in particular the declaring of a bank holiday - Congress
then reenacted the TEA, amended so as to authorize a wide variety of actions "dur-
ing time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President", Emergency Banking Act, 48 Stat. 1 (1933). For an account see Rossiter,
Dictatorship at pp. 257-8.
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form accused persons of the nature of the accusations 0
At a time of maximum policy conflict between "nine old men"
and an emergency-driven government, the Court hit the high point
of anti-delegation doctrine in the mid-1930's, striking down major
delegations of the Depression Congress to President Roosevelt.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 91 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. U.S.92 invalidated the National Recovery Act of 1933, which au-
thorized the President to (i) prohibit interstate transportation of pe-
troleum products produced in excess of limitations imposed by state
law, and (ii) to develop, with the aid of affected industries, binding
"Codes of Fair Competition". Carter v. Carter Coal Co.93 struck
down similar provisions of a statute regulating coal production.
Congress had failed, in the Court's view, to give sufficiently precise
guidance to the President or to private persons to whom it delegated
authority, in the form of basic policy determinations and careful pa-
rameters of decision.
In the same year, however, in what is now one of the leading
delegation cases, it sustained a Joint Resolution of Congress delegat-
ing to the President the power to determine whether or not an em-
bargo against arms sales to the adversaries in a South American war
would be in the national interest - this time emphasizing the in-
dependent powers of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs
as supporting the particular delegation. 94 Congress appears to have
learned how to do the job, and subsequent decisions have almost
eliminated the anti-delegation doctrine from the lexicon.95
Most recently, the Court has addressed itself to processes
whereby Congress has sought to control the exercise of delegated
authority after the delegation is made, and has demonstrated much
greater concern for separation of powers than the earlier delegation
decisions would have suggested. In Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha 96, the issue was the validity of the so-called
"legislative veto", Congress's favorite device (used in more than 200
statutes) for post-delegation control: the executive or administrative
agency would be required to report its action to Congress, which
90. U.S. v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
91. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
92. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
93. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
94. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
95. E.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939), in which it was held permissible to
assign to a vote of persons affected the decision of whether to implement a regula-
tion otherwise sufficiently well defined. For a brief but useful overview of the dele-
gation process in non-emergency situations, and its very accomodating treatment by
the courts, see L. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the Presi-
dent 100-111 (1985). As Tribe, note 71 at 362-369, makes clear, most of the action
now comes in interpreting the delegating statutes.
96. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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could override it or prevent its taking effect by a resolution of one
or both houses. In the case of an executive order suspending depor-
tation proceedings in certain cases, pursuant to a statute providing
for override of such a suspension by resolution of a single house, the
Court held that the override resolution was a legislative act, which
could only be accomplished by the constitutionally prescribed 97 pro-
cedure of passage by both houses followed by presentment to the
President for approval or veto. This procedure, said the Court, ap-
plies to any act "having the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative
branch...,"98 In Bowsher v. Synar 99 a somewhat less familiar device,
that of assigning partial responsibility for delegated action to an offi-
cial representing the Congress itself, was held invalid on the ground
that the action in question - determining when certain statutorily
defined budget deficit reduction targets had not been met, and iden-
tifying the automatic budget cuts called for by the statute in such
case - was inherently executive in nature, and therefore not dele-
gable to an official who is not fully a part of the executive branch.
These decisions in turn cast a shadow on Congress' efforts, after
a period of massive delegations to meet perceived emergencies, to
reassert control over the legislative process in such matters. The
current wave, which dates from the 1970's and is largely but not ex-
clusively traceable to the Vietnam War and the consequences of the
Watergate scandal, features three major statutes. First, the War
Powers Resolution of 1973100 tries to control the use of armed forces
abroad by limiting the President's power to introduce them into hos-
tilities to three situations: (a) declaration of war, (b) specific statu-
tory authorization, and (c) national emergency created by attack on
the U.S. or its armed forces. 10  Second, the National Emergencies
Act of 1976102 attempts to set automatic termination dates for many
existing delegations of power to the President triggered by declara-
tions of national emergency.10 3 Third, the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977,104 after another provision amended
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 to make it applicable only
to declared wars,10 5 granted new emergency economic powers to
97. Art. I § 7.
98. 462 U.S. at p. 952.
99. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
100. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq. (1982). For a brief but helpful political account see
L. Fisher, note 95, at 307-18.
101. Id. § 1541(c).
102. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1982).
103. A Senate report in 1973 identified 470 statutes authorizing the exercise of
emergency powers by the President, all activated by just 4 declarations of emer-
gency. See L. Fisher, note 95, at 300-1.
104. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1982).
105. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
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meet "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in
whole or substantial part outside the United States", and required a
Presidential declaration of national emergency to trigger them.1°6
Each of these statutes contained a legislative veto provision almost
certainly invalidated by Chadha107, with the result that Congres-
sional action to constrain the President under them will require full-
scale legislation, including a two-thirds vote of each house to over-
ride a presidential veto. To the extent that each - but especially
the War Powers Resolution - also purports to impose substantive
limitations on Presidential emergency power, it is objected to as an
unconstitutional encroachment on exclusive executive power.108
Each is also said by scholars to be ineffective to impose real controls
over Presidential initiative, either because the President often ig-
nores the prescribed limitations and procedures, or because the Con-
gress more often fails to exploit the opportunities to intervene. 10 9
The Supreme Court has not addressed these constitutional ques-
tions directly, but has tended in recent decisions to read Congres-
sional delegations in the international relations area broadly and
thereby, if anything, has supported advocates of primary executive
authority.1 0 In this respect the trend may be at least to modify the
106. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
107. See note 96.
108. For articulation of this view see, e.g., Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law",
50 Tex. L. Rev. 833 (1972), and "Once More Into the Breach: The War Powers Reso-
lution Revisited", 21 Val. U L. Rev. 1 (1986).
109. On the War Powers Resolution see, e.g., Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted A
War Powers Resolution That Worked", 88 Col. L. Rev. 1379 (1988); Van Alstyne, "In
a Republic and Under a Constitution Such as Ours, It Is for Congress to Say How
the Armed Forces Shall be Used", 43 U Miami L. Rev. 47 (1988); Goldstein, "The
Failure of Constitutional Controls Over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argu-
ment for a Constitutional Amendment", 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1543 (1988); Carter, "The
Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution", 70 Va. L. Rev. 101 (1984); Allison,
"Making War: The President and Congress", 40 Law & Contemp. Prob. 86 (1976);
Sofaer, "The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers", 40
Law & Contemp. Prob. 12 (1976).
On the International Economic Emergency Powers Act see, e.g., Note, "The
President's National Emergency Economic Powers After Regan v. Wald: An Un-
checked Proliferation of Authority", 12 Syr. . Int. L. & Com. 125 (1985); Note, "The
International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Con-
trol Presidential Emergency Power", 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1102 (1983).
110. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), interpreting the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, in conjunction with long-standing practice
in the claims settlement field, as authorizing the President to suspend private claims
against Iran arising out of the 1979 revolution until they have been disposed of by a
special international tribunal. For a comprehensive review of this decision, its back-
ground and consequences, see Note, "The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Con-
stitutional Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications", 85 Col. L. Rev. 155 (1985).
See also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), interpreting the IEEPA as leaving
in effect presidential regulations adopted under previous statutes to prohibit private
transactions with Cuba, including those related to travel to that country. For a criti-
cal assessment see, e.g., Note, "The President's International Emergency Economic
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approach taken in the Steel Seizure Case of interpreting a failure to
enact authority as equivalent to a prohibition thereof."'
B. Federal-State Relations
The leading decision on the non-existence of a general federal
emergency power, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US.,112 specifi-
cally applied a norm of limitation on federal power vis-a-vis the
states, in the form of a definition of the maximum reach of a regula-
tory power. As we have seen, the eventual result was a series of de-
cisions dramatically extending the reach of the regulatory power,
without any accompanying qualification that an emergency is re-
quired to utilize it. Since the war power is one over which the fed-
eral government has a monopoly under the constitution," 3 the
expansive reading given to the war powers by the Court (of which
we shall speak in more detail shortly) necessarily has the effect of
reducing state power in military emergencies. In the sense that
wars are by definition emergencies, then, it can be said that the con-
stitution recognizes exceptional federal power in such situations.
It is in this context that we encounter one of the few provisions
in the constitution which purport to impose affirmative duties on
the government: the so-called Guaranty Clause, which includes not
only the guaranty of a republican form of government but also pro-
tection against invasion or domestic violence. 114 In his discussion of
the clause in the Federalist,"5 James Madison made it clear that it
entailed duties both for the states and for the national government:
on the one hand the states are obligated to maintain a republic
form," 6 and on the other the federal government is obligated both
to enforce that obligation 1 7 and to protect states against invasion
(which can come from another state as well as from outside)" S or
domestic violence. Nonetheless the duties in question have been
Power After Regan v. Wald: An Unchecked Proliferation of Authority", 12 Syr. J.
Int7 L. & Com. 125 (1985).
111. For a critique on this point see L. Tribe, note 71, at 239-244.
112. See note 45.
113. See text at note 5. For a review of decisions, see Cowin, President at 201-3.
114. Text set forth in note 2.
115. Note 8, No. 43, pp. 311-314.
116. "As long ... as the existing republican forms are continued by the States,
they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to
substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal
guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not
exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions.. ." Id. at 312.
117. "In a confederacy based on republican principles... [the members have a]
right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered
into should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where
else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?"
Id. at 311-312.
118. Id. at 312.
1990]
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political and moral, without significant judicial intervention. Unlike
other power-granting provisions of the Constitution, this one is not
addressed to a particular branch of government. Congress provided
for the use of the militia in carrying out the duty to protect against
invasion or domestic violence, in conjunction with its militia power
specified in Art. I § 8, as early as 1792;119 but whereas the constitu-
tional language is mandatory, the statute and its successors to the
present have been permissive in form.120 While the only Supreme
Court decisions on the subject involved challenges to actual exercise
of this authority, which were either rejected as essentially non-justi-
ciable 121 or avoided on procedural grounds 122, there is no reason to
suppose that the Court would be less deferent to a President who
declined to honor a state's request for assistance.
Another provision of the current statutes governing "insurrec-
tion", this time addressing such as would result in deprivation of
constitutional rights, appears to use more mandatory language in its
delegation to the President - "shall" rather than "may" - but is
ultimately permissive in effect: "shall take such measures as he con-
siders necessary to suppress. ..,,1s A final provision is clearly
mandatory - if the President decides to use military forces to sup-
press insurrection, he must first give a proclamation to the insur-
gents to disperse 24 - but has never been enforced despite frequent
violation.12 5
The Guaranty Clause contains one procedural protection against
undue federal interference: the requirement that intervention to
protect against domestic violence follow a request of assistance from
the State. Congress translated this into a request requirement when
119. Act of May 2, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 264.
120. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1980): "Whenever there is an insurrection in any State
against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of
its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of
the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such
of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection."
121. Luther v. Borden, note 58, where the President had not actually called up
the militia in response to the governor's request, but had recognized the latter as the
legitimate chief executive and made preparations to call the militia if needed; Geor-
gia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (7 Wall.) 50 (1868) (involving a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867-9).
122. E.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Texas v. White, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), both dealing with the post-Civil War Reconstruction Acts
designed to impose acceptable governments on the defeated Confederate States,
which Acts were explicitly founded on the Guaranty Clause. For an account see
Kurland, "The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and
Local Officials", 62 So. Cal. L. Rev. 367, 435-445 (1989).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1982).
124. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1982).
125. For accounts see Longaker, note 26, at 196-208; Note, "Honored in the
Breech: Presidential Authority to Execute the Laws with Military Force", 83 Yale L.
J. 130 (1973).
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the President proposes to use armed forces or the militia to help a
state suppress an insurrection against the state's authority.12 6 This
does not apply, however, where the intervention is to enforce fed-
eral law as such, including those constitutional provisions designed
to protect the citizen against state action, such as denial of equal
protection of the laws, which may be violated by a state's inability to
enforce its own laws. 127 Thus when a strike against a railroad car
company turned violent in Illinois, and the liberal governor ex-
pressly asked the pro-business President not to intervene, the Presi-
dent did so anyway on the pretext that the strike was affecting
interstate commerce;128 the Supreme Court upheld the intervention
without mentioning the governor's objections, but the result would
clearly have been supported anyway by the present statutes.'29
III. EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. War Powers and Martial Law
1. Scope of National War Powers
We have noted that two constitutional provisions establishing or
recognizing quite concrete individual rights - the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the right to indictment by a grand jury
before being tried for a capital or other infamous crime - also con-
tain explicit exceptions for what may be broadly classified as mili-
tary emergencies. There are other provisions of comparable
concreteness which contain no such exceptions, such as the right of
the accused in criminal prosecutions to trial by jury - by clear im-
plication, in a regular court staffed by judges enjoying the protec-
tions of life tenure and freedom from salary diminution 30 - in the
district where the crime was committed.13' One might have inferred
from this that the Framers intended that the right to jury trial ap-
ply even in times of war or invasion or insurrection, but the Court
has treated the rights to indictment and jury trial as a unit. In doing
so, they have recognized a general exception for military emergency,
but have insisted that the conditions of the express exceptions be
met.
a. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The principal dispute specific to this provision has been over
where the power of suspension resides. The clause itself is located
126. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
127. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1982).
128. See Rossiter, Commander at 40-41.
129. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
130. Art. III § 1.
131. Art. III § 2 cl. 3; Amendment VI, cl. 2.
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in the Article on the legislative branch, and the judicial decisions
have reasoned (i) that the President lacks the power to suspend the
writ without Congressional authorization, 132 and (ii) that where
Congress authorizes a limited suspension, the President is bound by
those limitations. 33 Nonetheless, in the one period of extended use
of the suspension, President Lincoln acted initially without Congres-
sional authorization, pursuant to a claim of "public necessity", and
waited nearly three months after calling out the militia against the
attacking Confederacy before convening Congress to request ratifi-
cation of his actions. 34 Indeed in this respect Congress did not grant
him full authority until two years later 3 5 to do what he was doing
from the beginning; and, as we have seen, the Supreme Court's dis-
approval of his flouting the will of Congress did not come until after
the Civil War was over.136
b. Martial Law
In the early stages of the Civil War, President Lincoln also pro-
claimed the applicability of martial law generally - including trial
and punishment by military commissions and courts-martial - to all
persons within the U.S. "guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid
and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States". 3 7
In fact it appears that by far the most common practice was to arrest
and detain such persons without any trial at all, eventually releasing
them after they no longer posed a threat. 38 In any event, as we
have seen, the Supreme Court, once it got around to addressing the
issue, emphatically denied the legitimacy of such proceeding, with or
without Congressional authorization, insisting that the federal gov-
ernment may impose martial law only in case of actual invasion, and
may displace the courts for non-military crimes only if they are un-
able to function.'3 9 This conclusion, at least, seems commanded by
the Fifth Amendment exception to the requirement of a grand jury
indictment for "infamous" crime, which applies only to "cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service..
132. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 145, No. 9,487 (Circuit Court 1861), decided
by Chief Justice Taney sitting as circuit judge in first instance.
133. Ex parte Milligan, note 16; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, note 34.
134. For an account see Rossiter, Dictatorship at 225-230.
135. Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755.
136. Ex parte Milligan, note 16.
137. Vi J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 98 (1897), as quoted
in Rossiter, Dictatorship 235 (1948).
138. For an account with further references see Rossiter, Dictatorship 235-39, esp.
236: "Arrest without trial, detention without trial, release without punishment -
this was the program by which civil liberty was restricted during the Civil War."
139. Ex parte Milligan, note 16; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, note 34.
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c. War Powers Generally
Aside from the martial law cases, the dominant tone of judicial
interpretations of the war power has been accommodating, even
when dealing with their impact on individual rights. While a com-
plete review of war power decisions would exceed the bounds of this
paper, it seems appropriate to mention a few salient examples.
In preparation for war or other military action, it is permissible
to impose military law on a member of the militia who fails to an-
swer a call to service,140 and indeed to impose an obligation of mili-
tary service without the right to buy one's release.14 1
In the conduct of war, it is permissible to seize any property in-
volved in commerce with the enemy, regardless of the nationality of
the owner,142 as well as to deny direct review by the ordinary courts
of the judgments of military tribunals -- this as a matter of the
"common law of war", which may be applied to rebellions as well as
to war with foreign sovereigns. 143 With respect to the statutorily au-
thorized confiscation of property belonging to rebels during the Civil
War, the Court held in Miller v. United States'4 that the procedural
protections of the 5th and 6th Amendments (indictment by grand
jury, due process, just compensation for taking, trial by jury) do not
apply where no crime is defined or personal punishment imposed:
"[I]f the statutes were not enacted under the municipal
power of Congress to legislate for the punishment of crimes
against the sovereignty of the United States, if, on the con-
trary, they are an exercise of the war powers of the govern-
ment, it is clear they are not affected by the restrictions
imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments. 1 45
Already prior to World War II it was held permissible to regu-
late prices of strategically important products;146 the far more com-
prehensive price control and rationing system of World War II,
including the establishment of a separate court with exclusive com-
petence over decisions of the responsible administrative agency147
and a system of non-penal sanctions,1 48 also met with unsurprising
judicial approval.
By far the most controversial decisions of the Court concerning
the war power, however, remain those concerning Japanese-Ameri-
140. Martin v. Mott, note 57.
141. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
142. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635, esp. 667-8 (1863).
143. Ex parte Vallandigham, note 30.
144. Note 24.
145. 78 U.S. at 304-5.
146. Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., note 43.
147. Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
148. L.P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1945).
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cans in World War II: In Hirabayashi v. United States149 it unani-
mously upheld the imposition of a curfew applicable only to persons
of Japanese ancestry; and in Korematsu v. United States150 it up-
held, over dissents containing bitter charges of racism, a massive re-
location of such persons from their West Coast homes.151
In dealing with the consequences of war, it is permissible for
Congress to suspend the operation of state statutes of limitation or
prescription for the period of the conflict, and to do so retroac-
tively;152 it may prohibit production and sale of alcoholic beverages,
in order to conserve manpower and promote efficiency during demo-
bilization, as well as to conserve grain supplies;153 it may establish 5 4
or continue x55 rent control regulations after the end of hostilities in
order to combat the housing shortage produced by post-demobiliza-
tion demand. The Court has been careful in these decisions, how-
ever, to avoid giving the government a post-war carte blanche:
"We recognize the force of the argument that the effects of
war under modern conditions may be felt in the economy
for years and years, and that if the war power can be used
in days of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts
on our society, it may not only swallow up all other powers
of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth
Amendments as well. There are no such implications in to-
day's decision. We deal here with the consequences of a
housing deficit greatly intensified during the period of hos-
tilities by the war effort."'156
2. States' Power to Declare Martial Law
In the earliest of the Court's relatively few pronouncements on
the subject, 157 it sustained the action of state militiamen in breaking
into and searching the plaintiff's house, in order to arrest him as a
leader of armed insurgents in a battle over the legitimacy of the ex-
isting state government. The majority opinion confirmed the power
of martial law in the strongest of terms:
"...[U]nquestionably, a State may use its military power to
put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled
149. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
150. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
151. For an account written in 1951 which reflects the controversy at the time,
see Rossiter, Commander at 48-54, with references.
152. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493 (1871).
153. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
154. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
155. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
156. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. at 143-4.
157. Luther v. Borden, note 65.
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by the civil authority. The power is essential to the exist-
ence of every government, essential to the preservation of
order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States
of this Union as to any other government."''i
Nonetheless the Court recognized justiciable limits on the
power:
"No more force, however, can be used than is necessary to
accomplish the object. And if the power is exercised for the
purposes of oppression, or any injury willfully done to per-
son or property, the party by whom, or by whose order, it is
committed would undoubtedly be answerable.' 5 9
In Moyer v. Peabody'60 similar claims against a governor and
national guard officers for excessive detention without charge were
rejected on the ground that martial law had been declared and the
good faith of the defendants had not been challenged. Only when a
declaration of martial law was found to have been without founda-
tion in any serious threat of violence uncontrollable by civil author-
ity, and indeed a particular exercise of military power was
stimulated by the initiation of proceedings in federal court to chal-
lenge the governor's actions, did the Court invalidate the
declaration. 61
B. The Qualified Character of Individual Rights Protections
Having seen that even the most explicit and concrete rights of
criminal defendants are qualified by the war powers, we should not
be too surprised to find the Court treating essentially all individual
rights protections in our constitution as qualified or conditional
rather than absolute, whenever the language of the provision is suf-
ficiently general to admit of interpretation. We have already noted
that the protection for creditors provided by the Contract Clause is
subject to exception explicitly tied to emergency.162 An essentially
similar analysis, but not tied to emergency as such, can be found in
the Court's interpretation of the great sources of contemporary indi-
vidual rights doctrine: the Free Speech clause of the First Amend-
ment, the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendments,
and the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The judi-
cial watchword, even for the most privileged of such rights, is "strict
[or rigid] scrutiny", which means that government encroachment is
not per se impermissible, but may be justified by a showing of neces-
158. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
159. Id. at 46.
160. Note 73.
161. Sterling v. Constantin, note 71.
162. Text accompanying notes 54-56.
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sity for the protection of a compelling state interest. For others, and
sometimes even for these, other, less demanding "tests" have been
applied: "intermediate scrutiny", "balancing", "rational basis"; most
often there has been significant disagreement among the Justices as
to what test is appropriate. All involve some weighing of the gov-
ernment's interest against the individual's right in the particular
case.
The debate over this method of analysis, which has ushered in a
dramatic expansion of the individual rights enforceable against gov-
ernment, has centered on the legitimacy of unelected courts exercis-
ing control over the democratically responsive branches; the various
"scrutinies" are attacked and defended as talismans of civil rights ac-
tivism and liberalism. From the peculiar perspective of emergency
powers, however, the analysis clearly implies the legitimacy of the
claim of necessity. Brief reference to the most important decisions
will illustrate the limited point that I wish to make here, which is
that conditions which may be characterized as an "emergency" are
likely to support significant restrictions on individual liberty, and
that this flexibility is not considered as a suspension of or exception
to the individual right but as part of its very definition. In this con-
nection it is appropriate to begin precisely with the infamous Kore-
matsu decision.
1. Equal Protection of the Laws
The opinion of Justice Black in Korematsu opens with language
which has dominated analysis under the Equal Protection clause
ever since:
"It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
mediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public ne-
cessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restric-
tions; racial antagonism never can.' 63
The majority then proceeded to find just that pressing necessity
- now viewed with almost universal skepticism - in the war with
Japan. This new formulation of general principle is usually attrib-
uted - although the Korematsu opinions did not cite it - to a foot-
note in the majority opinion of a 1938 decision having to do with
purely economic rights,16 4 which was intended to suggest a rationale
for judicial enforcement of certain individual rights (especially those
of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment) by modifying
163. 323 U.S. at 216.
164. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152n.4 (1938).
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the presumption of validity usually applicable to a statute. 65 Even-
tually the strict scrutiny formula would enable the Court to invali-
date all racial segregation in schools 66 and other public facilities,
prohibitions against interracial marriage, 6 7 and poll taxes, 6 8 as well
as to motivate Congress to pass sweeping civil rights legislation. It
also invalidated the imposition of rigid quotas in academic admis-
sions, 69 as well as a city's set-aside of a fixed percentage of its public
works contracts for minority business,170 even when designed to al-
leviate the effects of racial discrimination practiced by the society as
a whole. On the other hand, in the only other type of case in which
racial classifications have survived "strict scrutiny", the Court found
a compelling interest to support racial classifications by courts (spe-
cifically, the assignment of pupils to schools on the basis of race), in
the need to provide an effective remedy for past unlawful
discrimination.171z
2. Freedom of Speech and Expression
The Supreme Court's decisions on the First Amendment's free-
dom of speech - another right for which "the footnote" suggested
preferred status - have been dominated by variants on the notion,
articulated by Justice Holmes in two cases arising out of World War
1,172 that speech which presents a "clear and present danger" of
"substantive evils that [government] has a right to prevent" may be
sanctioned without abridging the freedom of speech.173 In sustaining
a conviction for circulating letters advocating draft resistance,
Holmes said: '
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no Court could regard them as protected by any constitu-
tional right.' 74
Holmes thought that circulating a general polemic against capitalist
165. For an overview of the vast literature on "the footnote" see, e.g., Ackerman,
"Beyond Carolene Products", 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985), and the excellent sum-
mary by W. Wiecek, Liberty Under Law ch. 7 (1988). For an entire theory of judicial
review founded in large part on the footnote, see J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980).
166. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
168. Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
169. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
170. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., - U.S. -, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132 (1989).
171. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
172. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919).
173. 249 U.S. at 52.
174. Ibid.
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states interfering with the Russian revolution, on the other hand,
presented no such danger; but a majority of the Court disagreed.175
In the "Cold War" following World War II, the Court applied this
test to a charge of advocating the necessity of overthrowing the Gov-
ernment by force and violence as a member of the Communist
Party, and found the danger in the existence of "a group ready to
make the attempt".17 6 Eventually, in a somewhat less fearful time,
the Court translated this into what may be taken as the current test
for advocacy of unlawful action, that it may not be sanctioned "ex-
cept where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.' u77
The contemporary era of "national security" and global ideologi-
cal competition has also given rise to a number of cases involving
dissemination of information considered to be secret or sensitive. In
New York Times Co. v. United States178 the Court held that a gener-
alized claim of national security was insufficient justification for en-
joining the publication of a government document, already in the
hands of the press, reviewing the history of the Vietnam War. In
United States v. Nixon 179, on the other hand, the Court indicated in
dictum that protection of "military, diplomatic or sensitive national
security secrets"'8 0 would be a sufficient ground for the executive's
refusing a demand for disclosure of information relevant to a crimi-
nal trial - although the general claim of presidential confidentiality
made in the actual case was not.
The situation of former intelligence officers is less favorable for
a claim of freedom of speech in disclosing information about their
former jobs. In Snepp v. US.'18 a contract signed by a CIA agent as
a condition of employment, which required him to submit all writ-
ings about the agency for prepublication review even after his em-
ployment terminated, was enforced against him by imposing
punitive damages and a constructive trust on his earnings from an
unscreened book. The Court dismissed the First Amendment claim
by saying that even in the absence of an express agreement the
Agency would have been justified in imposing such restrictions:
"The Government has a compelling interest in protecting
both the secrecy of information important to our national
security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential
to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
175. Abrams, note 172.
176. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
177. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
178. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
179. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
180. Id. at 706.
181. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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service.' 18 2
In Haig v. Agee' 83 the Court sustained, on a similar rationale,
revocation of the passport of a former CIA agent who had disclosed
and planned further disclosures of the identity of agents abroad dur-
ing speaking tours in various countries, against a claim of the right
to international travel - a right which wis in any event of question-
able status.
3. Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The national security era has also produced controversy over
the use of electronic surveillance by the government. After the
Court had held that a warrant was required for such surveillance in
ordinary crime situations, 84 Congress enacted implementing legisla-
tion 85 which expressly left national security surveillance unregu-
lated. In a case involving surveillance of a wholly domestic group
suspected of violent attacks on CIA property, the Court held that
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment also applies to
internal security surveillance.186 In doing so, the Court emphasized
the involvement of freedom of expression in such cases:
"National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of
First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of
'ordinary' crime. Though the investigative duty of the exec-
utive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.... Fourth
Amendment protections become the more necessary when
the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to polit-
ical dissent is acute when the Government attempts to act
under so vague a concept as the power to protect 'domestic
security'."187
Following this decision, Congress and the President agreed on a
special statutory framework for such cases, which created a Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court consisting of seven judges appointed
by the Chief Justice, one of whom must approve any such surveil-
lance before it is undertaken. 188 It has been reported, to the obvious
satisfaction of the Attorney General, that in the first ten years of its
existence the special court has handled over 4000 requests for ap-
182. 444 U.S. at 509n.3.
183. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
184. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
185. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510f.
(1970).
186. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
187. Id. at 313-4.
188. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801f. (1982).
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proval, and has not denied a single one. 8 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The orthodox theory that the U.S. Constitution provides the
government with all the powers it needs to deal with any emergency
has been adhered to quite faithfully by the Supreme Court. While
the document itself provides for wartime exceptions to certain spe-
cific limitations on government action, most of the flexibility has
been supplied by a principle of interpretation which has been con-
sistently applied (if not always acknowledged): when measuring as-
sertions of governmental power against purported constitutional
limitations, the importance of the government's purpose will be
taken into account to the extent the constitutional language permits,
and greater deference will be given to the government's judgment in
times of military emergency. Tension arises, of course, when the
Court undertakes its own evaluation of the emergency; but on the
whole it has done so in the calm after the storm has passed. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify an instance in which judicial
intervention has prevented effective emergency action.
189. See Cinquegrana, "The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978", 137 U Pa. L.
Rev. 793, 814-5 (1989).
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